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Summary 
According to received opinion Ludwig Wittgenstein’s involvement 
with pictures was largely confined to the “picture theory” of the 
Tractatus. Kristóf Nyíri, in a series of articles, has considerably 
increased our awareness of the scope and subtlety of Wittgenstein’s 
treatment of this issue. Stepping outside the Platonist tradition and 
casting doubt upon writing’s privileged place in our intellectual 
history, Nyíri’s Wittgenstein can be seen as turning to pictorial 
representation as an alternative to literal culture. Nyíri has raised a 
point of utmost importance. A close inspection of the context of the 
Wittgenstein quote, supplemented by cross-references to earlier stages 
of the argument, will serve to focus upon the methodological 
importance of the issue under consideration. However, in spite of the 
appeal of Nyíri’s reading, it has to be set into balance. According to 
my understanding of the relevant remarks they do not support a 
pronounced opposition between verbal and pictorial representation. 
 
 
 
I. 
 
According to received opinion Ludwig Wittgenstein’s involvement 
with pictures was largely confined to the “picture theory” of the 
Tractatus, even though it is recognized that there is a recurring 
argument against “inner pictures” in his later philosophy. Kristóf 
Nyíri, in a series of articles, has considerably increased our awareness 
of the scope and subtlety of Wittgenstein’s treatment of this issue. 
Stepping outside the Platonist tradition and casting doubt upon 
writing’s privileged place in our intellectual history, Nyíri’s 
Wittgenstein can be seen as turning to pictorial representation as an 
alternative to literal culture. (Nyíri, 2001a, 2001b, 2003) Nyíri 
repeatedly draws attention to a remark that first appears in MS 114, 
p.228, PhG IX, 114 (1932): “Denn das Bild sollte doch die direktere 
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Sprache sein.” This remark, challenging verbalization as a prerequisite 
to understanding, deviates significantly from the Tractarian view. 
Sentential expressions, in order to carry information, have to depict 
the world. This much is standard Tractatus doctrine. But Wittgenstein 
seems to be proposing a more fundamental role for pictures here. 
How can we make sense of this? MS 114 is among the material 
underlying Rush Rhees’ edition of Philosophical Grammar and, as 
Nyíri correctly points out, Wittgenstein’s views on pictures according 
to the Nachlass evidence remain inconclusive. Wittgenstein, in 
particular, seems to switch between the advocacy of pictures as 
carriers of immediate knowledge and a more traditional approach: 
 
Pictures, or at least an important class of pictures, depend on 
words to designate univocally”. (Nyíri, 2001b) 
 
Nyíri has raised a point of utmost importance. A close inspection 
of the context of the Wittgenstein quote, supplemented by cross-
references to earlier stages of the argument, will serve to focus upon 
the methodological importance of the issue under consideration. 
Pictures are crucial to an understanding of Wittgenstein’s philosophy 
early and late. Nyíri adds a strong claim: 
 
And he attempted to overcome the barriers of verbal language by 
working towards a philosophy of pictures.” (Nyíri, 2001b) 
 
I recognize the appeal of this reading, but want to set it into 
balance. According to my understanding of the relevant remarks they 
do not support such pronounced an opposition between verbal and 
pictorial representation. Rather than trying to “overcome barriers” 
Wittgenstein ended up with a view that closely parallels visual and 
verbal modes of knowledge. He was not intent to address the concerns 
of multimedia society. I proceed in first discussing the MS 114 quote 
and — in a second step — relate it to a series of remarks in MS 111. 
Wittgenstein’s considerations establish, as the final section will show, 
a bridge directly linking the Tractatus to the Philosophical 
Investigations. 
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II. 
 
“Denn das Bild sollte doch eine direktere Sprache sein.” Wittgenstein 
is suggesting that articulating sentences is not the most immediate 
relationship towards the environment. “Für die Realität ist es doch ein 
Umweg, sich über die Sprache zu erklären.” (MS 114, p.228; PhG IX, 
114) Wittgenstein is discussing the example of a picture showing two 
men drinking wine in a tavern.1 He does not deny that we may utter an 
appropriate description when dealing with such a picture. The crucial 
question, however, is this: “Aber wie erklärt es sich in diesen 
Worten?” (loc.cit.) How does a picture manage to convey its meaning 
so that we can describe its content in a suitable way? This is a highly 
complicated matter which Wittgenstein (inconclusively) considers in 
some detail in the following pages of his manuscript. The issue 
resolves around his (tentative) claim: “Das Bild sagt mir also sich 
selbst.” (MS 115, p.1; PhG IX, 115) The picture tells me itself. I 
cannot discuss this matter in the present context,2 and would rather 
like to turn attention to the remarks preceding the question just raised. 
Interestingly, Wittgenstein is (1932) reappraising his Tractarian stance 
on pictures by revising a sequence of earlier remarks, initially put 
down in MS 111, p. 9ff (1931). Those remarks, at first glance, do not 
seem particularly noticeable among the paragraphs recording the 
results of Wittgenstein’s daily labor. Yet, there is something very 
special to the context of MS 111. The remarks dated from 8.6.1931 to 
15.6.1931 contain an argument linking Wittgenstein’s auto-criticism 
of the early Abbildtheorie to the initial pages of the Philosophical 
Investigations. It is an impressive proof of the unity of Wittenstein’s 
thought, turning on the treatment of pictures in cognitive pursuits. 
I’ll work my way back to this juncture starting with the setting in 
MS 114. Wittgenstein’s example, two men drinking wine in a tavern, 
                                                 
1 There is an amusing miss-transcription in the Bergen Electronic Edition here. 
Wittgenstein’s Dorfschenke is rendered as Dorfschule. Rush Rhees gets the word 
right, but spoils the quote by inserting a wrong preposition: “dieses Bild stellt Leute 
auf einer Dorfschenke dar”. (PhG IX, 114) 
2 I am writing a commentary on Wittgenstein’s MS 115, which starts dealing 
with precisely this question. This text is available within the framework of APE 
(Assistant for Philological Explorations), developed by Dieter Köhler. For further 
information see http://wittgenstein.philo.at. 
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is introduced with a particular purpose. It is stipulated to be a specific 
kind of picture, namely a genre piece. One might be tempted to 
consider this a minor details, but this would miss the crucial point, 
which is, in fact, of remarkable systematic importance, revealing — as 
I will show — the insufficiency of the Tractatus theory and hinting at 
the later Wittgenstein’s remedy. Remember, to get the hint, that the 
Tractatus did not take genre pictures (or any other non-literal modes 
of depiction) into account. The very idea of distinguishing between 
types of pictures is an elegant criticism of the earlier theory. 
 
Wenn wir den Satz mit einem Bild vergleichen, so müssen wir 
bedenken, ob mit einem Porträt (einer historischen Darstellung), 
oder mit einem Genrebild. Und beide Vergleiche haben Sinn. (MS 
114, p. 154; PhG IX, 114) 
 
The picture of the tavern exemplifies the second option, whereas 
the first one is illustrated thus: “dieses Bild stellt die Krönung 
Napoleons dar”. (MS 114, p. 155; PhG IX, 114) An historical portrait 
(or a photograph) refers to some specific situation, whereas a genre 
piece lacks this kind of designation. It does not indicate particulars 
actually conjoined in some configuration. Pictures may work either 
way. The next step in reconstructing Wittgenstein’s 1932 revision of 
his Tractatus tenets is to examine the features underlying both types 
of depiction. 
Thoughts are like pictures. Does this mean that pictures are 
essentially corresponding to something? “In der Abhandlung hatte ich 
so etwas gesagt wie: sie ist eine Übereinstimmung der Form. Das ist 
aber irreführend. —” (MS 114, p. 153) Mere isomorphism is 
insufficient to capture our understanding of pictures since this is a 
formal construction applicable to arbitrary sets of items: 
 
Alles kann ein Bild von allem sein: wenn wir den Begriff des 
Bildes entsprechend ausdehnen. (loc.cit.) 
 
We tend to respond to certain prominent traits of (common) 
pictures as if it were obvious that these particular traits constitute a 
distinct pictorial form. But this is jumping to conclusions. Such traits 
do not depict per se. They are in need of a method of projection which 
mere surface patterns lack. Now, according to the Tractatus a picture 
includes its projective relation (“die abbildende Beziehung”, Tractatus 
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2.1513). Wittgenstein likens this to feelers extended towards reality 
(Tractatus 2.1515). In 1932 he reaffirms that the general concept of 
projection implies some common denominator between its relata but 
he is more careful to distinguish a given determinate structure from its 
actual use according to some pictorial projection. A quick way to see 
the difference is to examine his comparison of a picture to a 
measuring rod. “Es ist wie ein Maßstab an die Wirklichkeit angelegt.” 
(Tractatus 2.1512) A superficial reading of this remark might suggest 
that we help ourselves to a standard of measurement by employing an 
artefact, e.g. a particular rod. (We certainly talk that way about 
measuring devices.) This reading is explicitly rejected by Wittgenstein 
in 1932. We use a measuring rod to determine an item’s length. 
 
Wenn ich den Satz mit einem Maßstab verglichen habe, so habe 
ich, streng genommen, eine Längenangabe mit Hilfe eines 
Maßstabs als Beispiel für alle Sätze gebraucht. (MS 114, p.154; 
PhG IX, 113)” 
 
There are many ways to use a wooden stick, even if one regards it 
as a measuring device. How does this insight affect the picture theory? 
Wittgenstein’s doctrine of atomic propositions was built upon the 
suggestion that we could name ultimately simple things and depict 
their configuration. But we cannot, as it turns out, fix the state of 
affairs an image represents by just employing pictorial form. (Cf. 
Hrachovec, 1978) If there are alternative methods of projection, no 
sentence, taken in isolation, can be put forward as atomic proposition. 
It cannot determine its correlate in reality outside, as it were, a 
projective process. Now, this is precisely the point of Wittgenstein’s 
remarks on the different grammar of a historical likeness (or 
photograph) as against a genre picture. If the method of projection is a 
generic one the pictorial form is not supposed to pick out one 
particular situation. It represents, in Tractarian terms, an “Urbild”, i.e. 
some logical form which is not (yet) fully instantiated. (Cf. 
Hrachovec, 2000) Wittgenstein’ remark “Das Denken ist ganz dem 
Zeichnen von Bildern zu vergleichen.” (MS 114, 154; PhG IX, 113), 
several times quoted by Nyíri, has to be read against this background. 
Thinking, according to this suggestion, is putting together forms 
which do not per se fix reference. This is no shortcoming, but simply 
a grammatical observation. If one recognizes that the physical 
measuring rod does not auto-magically determine the custom of 
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measuring (of which it is a necessary feature), one can see that the 
reality depicted by an image cannot simply be read off its internal 
structure. It is obvious that Wittgenstein’s discussion here is moving 
towards a theory of picture use. There is an interesting retrospective 
issue, though. How, precisely, were Tractarian pictures supposed to 
capture elementary facts? Can there be some projective method to 
achieve this aim? In order to clarify this point one has to turn to the 
context of MS 111, where Wittgenstein’s example of a picture taken 
literally — i.e. Napoleon’s coronation — first turns up. 
 
 
III. 
 
The date is June 8th, 1931 and Wittgenstein is considering the 
difference (if any) between thoughts and pictures. His handle to get a 
grip onto the problem is the case of Napoleon’s coronation depicted.3 
Wittgenstein poses the following question: Does an image like 
Napoleon’s not, after all, lack some capacity a thought presumably 
possesses, namely an unequivocal relationship to some state of 
affairs? 
 
Wenn das Bild die Krönung Napoleons darstellen soll, so müßte 
man das nicht darunter schreiben, wenn es in dem Bild enthalten 
wäre. (MS 111, p.9; WA 4, 7.1) 
 
 Wittgenstein tentatively assumes that (verbally articulated) 
thoughts are somehow “closer” to reality, but then objects: “Aber hier 
liegt ein Fehler” We are at the core of Nyíri’s puzzlement concerning 
Wittgenstein’s account of pictures. Nyíri clearly sympathizes with the 
notion of a picture being “the more direct language”, yet he has to 
concede that numerous remarks in the Nachlass point into a different 
direction. To repeat: pictures seem to depend on words to designate. 
According to the Wittgenstein remark just quoted there is something 
wrong with this account. Nyíri will certainly be interested to learn 
more about this mistake. The short answer is that neither words nor 
pictures quite work as envisaged in the Tractatus. The intricate 
                                                 
3 Via TS 211 and TS 213 (“The Big Typescript”) this motive is subsequently 
carried over to Wittgenstein’s revision of TS 213 in MS 114 where we initially 
picked it up. 
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argument has to be reconstructed from a loosely associated series of 
remarks running through several pages of MS 111. Wittgenstein’s 
associative discourse lacks explicit structure, but I will show that his 
discussion of thought versus pictures naturally leads towards (what 
was to become) the opening sequence of the Philosophical 
Investigations. 
So, what is wrong in holding that pictures lack a certain 
determinacy available only to verbal articulation? Wittgenstein does 
not — in 1931 — distinguish (historically) accurate representations 
from genre pieces, but we can put the issue in those terms: How to 
distinguish an image showing the coronation of some king from this 
very image showing Napoleon taking part in the ritual? The picture, 
taken out of context, cannot help. (Remember the measuring rod.) 
Obviously, the picture’s application has to be taken into account. At 
this point Wittgenstein seems to loose sight of the issue and sets up a 
surprising challenge to pictures in general, invoking a basic Tractarian 
intuition: “Das Charakteristische an der Sprache ist, daß alle 
Erklärungen zum voraus gegeben werden können.” (MS 111, p.10, 
WA 4, 7.2) This is because Logic provides us with a regime to capture 
all possible content within the space of cognitively admissible 
possibility once and for all. Pictures are clearly unsuited to fulfil this 
requirement, even though Wittgenstein toys with the idea to regard a 
sequence of drawings as a language. Images cannot be joined by 
logical connectives and cannot be forced into closure as Tractatus 6 
proposes for sentences. The result of this “digression” on part of 
Wittgenstein actually seems to strengthen the case for verbalism. Yet, 
we are but one step away from a momentous switch. 
Wittgenstein’s Tractatus is well known for his vision of Logic as a 
meta-epistemological force gluing together language and reality by 
determining admissible forms of depiction. Logic is operative in 
meaningful language which is articulated in sentences that are likened 
to pictures. Now, whereas only verbal units can be used to build the 
hermetic universe of admissible rationality, governed by judgments 
that follow truth-functional rules, there is an opposite end to this story. 
We have, in fact, already encountered the relevant motive. Neither 
sentences nor pictures, taken in isolation, are sufficient to determine 
their correlate states of affairs. Dealing with sentences we might be 
inclined to think that the logic of language provides the necessary 
link, quasi hooking an expression onto the world in naming and 
judgment. This view is certainly strongly suggested in the Tractatus. 
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But the later Wittgenstein is not persuaded by this and his point is 
precisely that (i) this link-up does not work for pictures and (ii) 
because of the pictorial nature of sentences it does not work for verbal 
expressions either. 
Ideal language encompasses all possible explanations. 
 
Das Charakteristische an der Sprache ist, daß alle Erklärungen von 
vornherein/zum voraus/ gegeben werden können. D.h. daß man sie 
alle mußte voraussehen können und keine erst ad hoc gegeben 
werden muß. (Und das ist es, was die Bildhaftigkeit auszumachen 
scheint.) (MS 111, p.10, WA 4, 7.3) 
 
A presumed genre piece — on the contrary — might very well 
turn into an accurate description ad hoc, i.e. by its structural features 
being projected upon a definite state of affairs. Logic provides a 
categorical tool-set to undertake this projection (“name”, “concept”), 
but it cannot achieve the basic fit. This has to be (re)done in every 
single case. General logic does not encompass picture use. 
Wittgenstein has become aware of the fact that his picture theory lacks 
an account of how pictorial forms are actually projected onto the 
world. His argument is by no means clear-cut but here is an interim 
summary: People tend to assume that thoughts and sentences are per 
se directed towards their intentional correlates, whereas pictures seem 
to be less “direct”. Verbal language, comprising sentences and 
judgments seems to be prefixed onto a world, while pictures lack this 
conceptual feature. They have to be fitted ad hoc. We have now 
assembled the prerequisites to explain why Wittgenstein finds fault in 
those assumptions. Closer examination of pictures reveals a (largely) 
hidden side of the Tractatus. The whole edifice rests upon a barely 
acknowledged pragmatic scenario. 
In Wittgenstein’s reassessment of the picture theory in 1931-32 
Logic is no longer governing the application of syntactic tokens to 
semantic entities. 
 
Denn, was ich sagte, kommt eigentlich darauf hinaus: daß jede 
Projektion, nach welcher Methode immer, etwas mit dem 
Projizierten gemeinsam haben muß. (MS 114, p.153, PhG IX, 113) 
 
This idea is already present in MS 111 
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Oder soll ich sagen: Solange man das Bild mit nichts vergleicht, 
kann man es mit Allem vergleichen. (MS 111, p.11, WA 4, 7.6) 
 
Clearly, the grammar of literal depiction has to include a 
sensitivity to particular situations. “Das hängt mit dem Problem von 
hier und jetzt zusammen.” (MS 111, p.11, WA 4, 7.7) Names and 
predicates (and their semantic relata) depend upon the employment of 
certain syntactic givens within the framework of some projection. And 
Wittgenstein is quite clear about the tension between the ad hoc 
element introduced by indexicals and his postulate of logical ubiquity: 
 
In gewissem Sinn ist die Bedeutung der Wörter ‘hier’, ‘jetzt’ (etc) 
die einzige, die ich nicht von vornherein festlegen kann. (MS 111, 
p. 11, WA 4, 8.1) 
The use of pictorial forms is irreducibly sensitive to context and 
this sensitivity is essential in determining what it is we think and 
speak about. We have, finally, arrived at the source of the mistaken 
impression of an “inferiority” of pictures. Proceeding top down it 
seemed that verbal expressions have no need for any additional 
projective machinery, since Logic takes care of language-world-
contact. But if one looks at the issue from bottom up it becomes 
obvious that correspondence according to the Tractatus model can 
only work if verbal and/or pictorial structures are put to use in single 
cases. The difference between a man in a king’s gown and Napoleon 
is how a certain semiotic input is employed in addition to its pictorial 
or verbal features. Words on their own do not provide what pictures 
lack. What seemed to be a deficit of pictures turns out to be a 
foundational problem of Tractarian semantics. This concludes the 
reconstruction of a Wittgensteinian argument in line with Nyíri’s 
intuitions. There are some open ends, though. Wittgenstein’s ensuing 
remarks in MS 111 impressively demonstrate how crucial this 
problem is to his philosophy in general. And there is a flip side. It 
looks like we have just suspended one of the main reasons to 
distinguish verbal and pictorial means of communication and this does 
not square well with Nyíri’s tendency to paint Wittgenstein as an, 
albeit hesitant, pictorialist. 
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IV. 
 
I have quoted Wittgenstein to the effect that indexicals are unique 
among verbal expressions insofar as their meaning cannot be fixed in 
advance. But this is only the beginning of a more extensive argument. 
Wittgenstein qualifies his claim by adding: 
 
Die Bedeutung ist festzulegen und festgelegt, wenn die Regeln 
bezüglich dieser Worte festgelegt sind, und das kann geschehen, 
ehe sie in einem bestimmten Fall angewandt werden; [...] (MS 
111, p 12, WA 4, 8.1) 
 
The pendulum swings back. We have observed Wittgenstein’s 
move towards the ad hoc constitution of meaning which is 
systematically linked to his analysis of the projective method. He now 
turns back to his initial demand for language to be semantically 
determinate a priori. His discussion in MS 111 deviates from the 
Tractatus doctrine by explicitly acknowledging the contingency of the 
employment of language — but he is still holding on to his exacting 
ideal of logical closure before any facts are taken into account. It is 
not obvious how he is going to resolve this tension. But notice: 
Wittgenstein comes up with one of the most important maxims of his 
later philosophy at this very point. 
So-called “original contexts” are often charged with surplus 
(ideological) importance and it is important to remember that many of 
Wittgenstein’s Nachlass-remarks are transformed by re-
contextualization again and again. Yet, it seems difficult not to put 
considerable emphasis on the precise location at which the slogan 
“meaning is use” makes his first appearance. “Die Bedeutung eines 
Worts verstehen, heißt, seinen Gebrauch kennen, verstehen.” (MS 
111, p. 12, WA 4, 8.3). This remark is echoed in MS 114, p.25: 
 
Das Verständnis der Sprache — quasi des Spiels — scheint wie 
ein Hintergrund, auf dem der einzelne Satz erst Bedeutung 
gewinnt. Wenn “Die Bedeutung eines Wortes verstehen” heißt, die 
Möglichkeiten seiner grammatischen Anwendung kennen [...] 
 
The canonical form of this note is to be found in Philosophical 
Investigations § 43: “Die Bedeutung eines Wortes ist sein Gebrauch in 
der Sprache.” Wittgenstein’s philosophical style is austere and he does 
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often not care to spell out how adjacent remarks are discursivly 
connected. In view of the prominence of the remark under 
consideration it seems legitimate to attempt a step-to-step construction 
of the underlying rationale. We have a priori Logic to start with, 
challenged by the insight into ad hoc application of syntactic items. 
How is this tension to be reconciled? The crucial concept is language 
games. Words are meaningful insofar as they are embedded within 
linguistic practice. One prominent dilemma of Tractarian thinking 
resolves directly into this notion introduced at the beginning of the 
Investigations. 
Here is how the shift from quasi-transcendental Logic towards 
language games answers the particular problem we have been 
discussing. The a priori demand is covered by a game’s rules, which 
have (in principle) to be set out independently of a game’s instances. 
Yet, such rules are, by a feedback mechanism, linked to the game’s 
actually being played. Wittgenstein’s views on rule following replace 
the earlier tension between Logic and contingency. He started off with 
a doctrine of the pictorial nature of thought which included a 
correspondence theory of truth. Now we can see that the Tractarian 
claim, resting on a traditional notion of Logic, is just one of numerous 
possible constraints we might impose upon a language game. 
Wittgenstein’s emphasis switches from the patterns of isomorphism 
towards semiotic contexts of expressive use. His suggestions in MS 
111 contain what was to become the initial thrust of the 
Investigations. “Verbindung von Wort und Sache durch die Erklärung 
[das Lehren der Sprache] hergestellt” he notes on June 14th, 1931 
(MS 111, p. 13, WA 4, 8.7). This day’s last entry reads: “Augustinus 
über das Lernen der Sprache.” And June 15th, 1931 continues with the 
very first extended discussion of language learning according to 
Augustinus. 
 
Diese Auffassung des Fundaments der Sprache ist offenbar 
äquivalent mit der, die die Erklärungsform ‘das ist [...]’ als 
fundamental auffaßt. (MS 111, p. 16, WA 4, 10.1) 
 
The initial dependence on logical form is revealed as the consequence 
of an impoverished approach to language as Wittgenstein rejects his 
own former theory under the guise of a quote from the medieval 
philosopher. 
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In an important sense this is the demise of Wittgensteinian picture 
theory as early as 1931. It is, of course, true that Wittgenstein 
remained interested in the working of pictures and that he kept 
exploring the issues of representation mediated by images in his notes 
on the philosophy of psychology. Nyíri has helpfully put together the 
evidence from the Nachlass. Yet, with the change from language-
world-correspondence (by means of pictorial form) to language games 
the very distinction on which Nyíri’s explorations are built seem to 
rest on shaky grounds. Here is Nyíri’s description of the orthodoxy: 
 
The later Wittgenstein is interpreted as holding a use theory of 
pictures, according to which pictures themselves do not carry any 
meaning; they acquire meaning by being put to specific uses and 
by being applied in specific contexts. Those uses and contexts are 
defined by language; pictures are subservient to words [...] (Nyíri, 
2001b) 
 
As we have seen, this view is correct as far as the ad hoc character 
of pictorial projection is concerned, but incorrect in inferring a 
subservience of pictures. The problem of projection is perfectly 
general: any representation presupposes the employment of some 
tokens within a practice guided by some interests. The distinction 
between words and images does not carry any weight here. 
Wittgenstein’s Nachlass should not be scrutinized to find out his 
possible position in the imagery debate or whether he takes sides pro 
or contra literal (versus pictorial) meaning. The material does contain 
quite a number of helpful remarks on pictures and Nyíri is perfectly 
right in drawing our attention to Wittgenstein’s persistent interest in 
this subject. But Nyíri over-plays his hand with claims like “Written 
language as a source of philosophical confusion was Wittgenstein’s 
real foe.” (Nyíri, 2001b) The main line to be drawn is not between 
words and pictures, but between language games (encompassing a 
whole number of possible signifying features). One of Wittgenstein’s 
most famous advices is, after all, both a piece of criticism of language 
and an iconoclastic intervention: “Ein Bild hielt uns gefangen. Und 
heraus konnten wir nicht, denn es lag in unserer Sprache”. (PI 115). 
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